Leniency Programs and Cartel Prosecution. by MOTTA, Massimo & POLO, Michele
,N+, NWV,+5WAv W5AWANA,
#,+A,A 6 ,W5






#W 6W,5wc 5 #,W E6W** h}|t hitihi_
L T@h| Lu |t T@Tih 4@) Mi hiThL_Ui_ ? @?) uLh4
|L| Tih4ttL? Lu |i @|Lh
U bbb  L||@ @?_  L*L
h?|i_ ? W|@*) ? a*) bbb
,hLTi@? N?iht|) W?t|||i
@_@ 6itL*@?@
WDffS 5@? #L4i?UL E6W
W|@*)Leniency Programs and Cartel Prosecution
Massimo Motta
European University Institute, Florence
Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona
Michele Polo
Bocconi University and IGIER, Milan⁄
June 7, 1999
Abstract
We study the enforcement of competition policy against collusion under Leniency Programs,
which give reduced ﬂnes to ﬂrms revealing information to the Antitrust Authority. Such programs
give ﬂrms an incentive to break collusion, but may also have a pro{collusive eﬁect, since they
decrease the expected cost of misbehaviour. We analyze the optimal policy under alternative rules
and with homogeneous and heterogeneous cartels, obtaining a ranking of the diﬁerent schemes and
showing when the use of reduced ﬂnes may improve antitrust enforcement.
⁄We beneﬂted from discussions with Luis Cabral, Federico Ghezzi, Patrick Rey, Thomas Von Ungern{Sternberg and
seminar participants at the University of Salerno and the European University Institute (Fiesole). Their comments are
gratefully acknowledged.1 Introduction
The enforcement of competition policy against collusion and price ﬂxing agreements is one of the
main ﬂelds of antitrust intervention. Recent developments show that the attention devoted by antitrust
authorities to collusive agreements has not diminished over time. Recently, the DGIV, the Directorate{
General of the European Union in charge of competition policy, has established a special investigation
unit against cartels1, and a similar pattern can be found in the US, where the Antitrust Division of the
Department of Justice has reallocated and improved the resources of the Criminal section in charge
for cartel prosecution2.
In the design of the policy we ﬂnd today richer and more complex mechanisms than those
based simply on an increase in ﬂnes. Since 1978 the US Antitrust Division of the Department of
Justice has allowed for the possibility of avoiding criminal sanctions if speciﬂc conditions occurred.
In 1993 this policy has been redesigned in the Corporate Leniency Policy, which establishes that
criminal sanctions can be avoided in two cases: either if a colluding ﬂrm reveals information before
an investigation is opened, as it was in the previous regime, or if the Division has not yet been able
to prove collusion when a ﬂrm decides to cooperate3. The new Leniency Policy has shown in the ﬂrst
years of application a signiﬂcant success in terms of the number of cases that the Division has been
able to open and successfully conclude.
The current EU system draws from the US experience. In order to reach a more eﬁective
deterrence of collusive practices, the DGIV has initially focused its enforcement policy on a sharp
increase in ﬂnes: the average ﬂne given to ﬂrms involved in collusion cases, up to the mid Eighties has
remained below 500.000 ECU while in the last decade it has reached an average of around 1.500.000
ECU4. However, if the ﬂrms anticipate a low probability of having collusive practices discovered (and
proved), ﬂnes alone will be insu–cient to prevent ﬂrms from establishing cartels. Although it is
hard to quantify such expected probabilities, there seems to be a wide perception that the deterrence
eﬁects of the ﬂnes has been relatively poor, and that various types of collusive practices are still
widespread. This has pushed the European Union to introduce5 a new regime in which reduced ﬂnes
can be given to ﬂrms which cooperate with the antitrust authority by providing evidence of a collusive
agreement in which they have been involved. A 75{100% reduction in ﬂnes6 c a nb eg i v e ni fﬂ r m s
reveal information before an inquiry is opened, while a lower reduction (50{75%) can be granted
if cooperation occurs after an investigation has started, but that investigation has failed to provide
su–cient grounds for initiating a procedure leading to a decision. A 10{50% reduction in ﬂnes can
be given for partial cooperation, such as providing additional evidence or not contesting the facts on
which the Commission bases its allegations. Moreover, only the ﬂrst ﬂrm which cooperates can obtain
a reduction, provided that it is not the promoter and major partner of the cartel. It is too early to
evaluate the eﬁects of this new policy, although the US experience suggests that enforcement against
cartels might become more eﬁective.
1See Venit (1996), p.92, and European Union (1999, p.22).
2See Bingman and Spratling (1995).
3Some additional restrictions on the ﬂrms entitled to beneﬂt from this regime are introduced, as the fact that only
the ﬂrst can be given a ﬂne reduction, and that it must be a junior partner in the cartel.
4See Furse (1995), p.114.
5European Union (1996).
6Notice that while in the US the regime applies to criminal sanctions (which include both ﬂnes and incarceration), in
the EU reductions are referred only to monetary ﬂnes. Criminal sanctions do not exist under EU competition law.
1In this paper we want to investigate the diﬁerent eﬁects that the introduction of a Leniency
Program7 can have on both ﬂrms’ behaviour and deterrence. Our work is related to other papers
on the optimal enforcement of law, speciﬂcally those on pre{trial negotiation and settlement8 and
on plea{bargaining9, in which these alternative judicial procedures have been studied with a general
reference to the US judicial system, although not explicitly to antitrust law.
There are however several important diﬁerences between our work and the existing literature.
The papers on pre{trial negotiation have considered mainly the properties of these procedures in
saving trial costs preventing wasteful litigation. In the plea bargaining literature the enforcer acts
more explicitly on behalf of taxpayers, balancing the goal of condemning the guilty agents and not
condemning the innocent ones with the minimization of resources devoted to enforcement. In both
cases, the issue of deterrence is not really addressed: agents have (possibly) already committed a
crime, and in most papers, whether the agent is innocent or guilty and how strong is the evidence
against him (agent’s type) is exogenous in the model, and it is not explained in terms of incentives to
commit a crime. The eﬁects of the legal procedures on preventing the crime or making it to cease are
instead at the center of our analysis.
In our paper we are mainly concerned with the deterrence and desistence properties of negotia-
tions between the Antitrust Authority and private ﬂrms. The enforcer is motivated by the maximiza-
tion of social welfare and aims at minimizing the occurrence of collusion among ﬂrms by committing
on a certain set of policy parameters10. In order to focus on deterrence, in our setting we exclude
other ingredients already studied in the literature. First of all we do not consider (variable) litigation
costs on either party, a central issue in the pre{trial negotiation literature. The enforcer’s budget
is set at the beginning of the game and enforcement costs are sunk, i.e. they are already allocated
among the diﬁerent tasks of the organization, as general monitoring or prosecution. Secondly, we do
not consider the possibility of wrong sentences, analyzed in the plea{bargaining papers: at the end of
an investigation either a guilty ﬂrm is condemned or no evidence is reached.
In this setting we consider several issues. First of all we analyze the reaction of ﬂrms to diﬁerent
policy regimes, i.e. on the incentive to collude and on the decision to reveal or not information to the
Antitrust Authority. A perverse eﬁect can arise under this respect: since a Leniency Program allows
ﬂrms to pay reduced ﬂnes, it may have ex-ante a pro{collusive eﬁect, decreasing the expected cost
of anticompetitive behaviour. But we show that, if the Antitrust Authority has limited resources,
and is therefore unable to prevent collusion ex{ante, the use of Leniency Programs can improve the
eﬁectiveness of the policy, by sharply increasing the probability of interrupting collusive practices.
Hence, in a second best perspective, ﬂne reductions may be desirable because they allow to better
implement ex{post desistence from collusion.
There is however a third component that operates in equilibrium: in order to induce ﬂrms to
reveal, a Leniency Program has to commit resources to guarantee a su–ciently high probability of
independent prosecution. This is the implicit cost of a reduced ﬂnes regime, since those resources
are subtracted from the general monitoring activity, which determines the frequency of \revelations"
and successful inquiries. As the resources committed to prosecution become too costly, a Leniency
7The US Leniency Program involves both reductions of ﬂnes and the elimination of the threat of incarceration. In
this paper we focus on reduced monetary ﬂnes. Hence, we use the term Leniency Programs in a broad sense.
8Bebchuk (1984), Nalebuﬁ (1987), Schweizer (1989), Shavell (1989).
9Grossman and Katz (1983), Reinganum (1988).
10Other papers that are related to our own are Kobayashi (1992) and Marshall, Muerer and Richard (1994).
2Program loses its appeal, and a full ﬂnes regime may become more convenient again. The conditions
under which these results hold will be identiﬂed in both a homogeneous and a heterogeneous cartel
setting. The eﬁects and desirability of alternative leniency rules will also be studied.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we set up the basic model, in which every ﬂrm
which decides to cooperate with the Antitrust Authority is given a ﬂne reduction. In section 3 we
consider alternative Leniency Programs, in which ﬂne reductions can be granted only if cooperation
occurs before an investigation is opened, or in which only the ﬂrst comer, or a speciﬂc ﬂrm, is entitled
to a reduced ﬂne. Finally, in section 4 we extend the basic model to the heterogeneous cartels case.
Section 5 concludes the paper.
2T h e M o d e l
Throughout the paper, we assume that the Antitrust Authority (AA from now on) aims at maximizing
a utilitarian social welfare function and is able to commit to a certain set of policy parameters11,w h i c h
consist of full and reduced monetary ﬂnes and probabilities of enforcement. In the basic model of this
section we consider a regime in which all ﬂrms which cooperate in the investigation even after this
has been opened, and which simultaneously provide useful evidence to prove collusion12, can beneﬂt
from a reduction in ﬂnes. In the following sections we shall consider alternative rules and compare
them with this benchmark case.
The AA is (exogenously) endowed with a per{period budget B: in line with the literature, we
assume that setting the ﬂnes at any level is not costly, while increasing the probability of enforcement
requires resources. More precisely, we assume that the maximum ﬂne that ﬂrms can receive if found
guilty of collusion is exogenously given by law and equal to F, a ﬂxed amount of money: then, being
costless, it is always optimal to set the full ﬂne at this maximum level. However, the AA can commit
to a Leniency Program which allows for reduced ﬂnes R • F to ﬂrms which reveal information useful
to prove the existence of collusion. Indirectly, that is via the allocation of its given resources among
diﬁerent tasks, the AA determines the probability ﬁ of opening an investigation and the probability p
of proving ﬂrms guilty. The former refers to the preliminary activities (general monitoring) necessary
to open an investigation such as collecting information about the ﬂrms in the industry, interviewing
ﬂrms, suppliers and customers, collecting data from the diﬁerent sources; the latter (prosecution)
involves collecting further more focused information on the case, ordering surprise \raids" in the
ﬂrms’ headquarters, processing the information collected and preparing the case against the ﬂrms
according to the existing laws. The AA, allocating resources to these two groups of tasks can obtain
a combinations of these probabilities according to their speciﬂc production functions13. The budget
11This is in line with actual experience, in which little discretion is left by the law to the Authority as to the conditions
under which reductions can be given, and their amount.
12Throughout the paper, we assume that information given by a single ﬂrm is enough to prove that all the ﬂrms which
have taken part in the collusion are guilty. This might be interpreted as the case where each ﬂrm has access to the
minutes of the meetings which take place among all the colluding ﬂrms, or has copies of letters, faxes or e{mail messages
which all the ﬂrms have used to coordinate on the collusive outcome. Since an important component in the working of
cartels is the coordination of moves among participants, the access of each partner to some information regarding the
others seems quite realistic.
13More precisely, let the AA budget constraint be B = w(lﬁ+lp); where B is the total budget available to the Authority;
lﬁ the number of hours allocated to general monitoring and lp those devoted to prosecution, w the wage rate. In turn,
the probabilites are determined given the resources according to the production functions ﬁ = kﬁl, and p = kpl, with ﬁ
3constraint is then:
B = wﬁﬁ + wpp (1)
where wﬁ and wp are the (constant) unit cost of monitoring and prosecution. We assume that ﬂrms
know the probabilities ﬁ and p chosen by the AA and its budget constraint.
The AA objective function is a standard utilitarian welfare function, i.e. the sum of producers
and consumers surplus. Fines, whether full or reduced, are pure transfers, i.e. they go to the general
government budget and are redistributed to consumers without distortions, and cannot be used by the
AA to increase its budget. The agency problem can therefore be described as choosing the incentive
scheme (R;ﬁ;p) in order to in￿uence ﬂrms’ behaviour and maximize social welfare. The incentive
compatibility constraints will be derived from the analysis of the subgame perfect equilibria in the
supergame played by ﬂrms once the policy parameters are set. After observing the policy parameters
chosen by the AA, n identical ﬂrms decide whether to collude or not, by correctly taking into account
the probabilities (ﬁ;p) and by knowing whether a Leniency Program R is in place or not.
We follow the usual supergame literature and consider the incentive of each ﬂrm to play an
action which leads to the collusive outcome given that all other ﬂrms take the collusive action. If a
ﬂrm deviates it earns a proﬂt ƒD in the current period but it triggers the punishment of the other
ﬂrms, which will play the one{shot non{cooperative equilibrium action forever afterwards, by giving
the deviating ﬂrm a total discounted payoﬁ of ƒD + –ƒN=(1 ¡ –). If instead the ﬂrm decides to take
the collusive action, then it earns a payoﬁ of ƒM (with ƒN < ƒM < ƒD) in the current period.
We assume that the existence of a collusive outcome in the industry is perfectly observed by
the antitrust agency, but this is not enough for collusion to be proved in courts. To be able to build
a case against the ﬂrms (which would otherwise win the appeal in a Court), the AA needs to ﬂnd
some \hard" information about collusion. Such information might consist of any document proving
that ﬂrms have agreed on prices or have met to coordinate on the prices to be charged14. Perfect
observability of collusive prices also implies that the antitrust agency will never open an investigation
on ﬂrms which do not collude at equilibrium.
For simplicity we consider the case where ﬂrms decide once and for all at the initial period
whether to collude or to deviate from the projected cartel15. From our discussion so far, the timing
of the game, represented in Figure 1, is as follows:
and p 2 [0;1], characterized for simplicity by positive and constant marginal productivity. Then the labor requirement
to obtain ﬁ and p are lﬁ(ﬁ)=ﬁ=kﬁ and lp(p)=p=kp respectively and the total cost of implementing ﬁ and p are
wlﬁ(ﬁ)=wﬁ=kﬁ = wﬁﬁ and wlp(p)=wp=kp = wpp. It will be clear in the analysis that assuming decreasing marginal
productivity, which would imply a concave budget line and a convex budget set, would not alter all our conclusions.
14To this purpose, note that in our model, like any repeated game with an inﬂnite horizon, there exists a continuum
of possible equilibria, and ﬂrms need some coordination to select the fully collusive outcome giving them the per{period
proﬂt ƒM.
15In our setting, this is not a completely innocent assumption since the game becomes stationary only after the initial
period, once ﬂrms have started colluding: considering the choice of deviating for any t>1 is equivalent, since in this
case ﬂrms, having participated for some periods to a cartel, pay an expected ﬂne even if they deviate later on. When
deviating initially, on the contrary, a ﬂrm can avoid the ﬂne, since it never participated to the illegal agreement. However,
notice that for this reason a deviation at the beginning is more attractive than breaking down the cartel later on, and
the associated constraints are more stringent. Since the alternative case makes the analysis more complex but gives the
same qualitative results, we have preferred to keep the simplest version where ﬂrms decide only at t = 1 whether to
deviate or collude.
4t = 0 The Antitrust Authority determines the policy parameters R;ﬁ;p, which are observed by all
ﬂrms. The reduced ﬂne R is granted to any ﬂrm cooperating even after the investigation is
opened.
t =1 F i r m si =1 ;::;n decide whether to collude or deviate and realize the per{period associated
payoﬁ.
t = 2 The AA opens an investigation with probability ﬁ 2 [0;1]. If the inquiry is not opened, each
ﬂrm realizes the per{period proﬂts associated to the previous choice. If the investigation starts,
ﬂrms simultaneously decide whether to reveal information that the AA will ﬂnd useful to prove
collusion; if at least one ﬂrm reveals, the AA is able to prove them guilty. The ﬂrm(s) which
cooperated with the AA pays R • F while the others pay the full ﬂne F. If no ﬂrm reveals, the
AA is able to prove them guilty with probability p 2 [0;1]. If the AA has not been able to prove
the ﬂrms guilty of collusion at the end of this inquiry, the ﬂrms will never be investigated again
in the future. If proved guilty, they will behave non{cooperatively forever in the future.
t>2 If up to the previous period the AA has not started an investigation, with probability ﬁ it opens
an inquiry in t, ﬂrms decide whether to reveal, and so on.
Figure 1 about here
We can now solve for the equilibrium of this game. Our ﬂrst step is to identify the incentive
compatibility constraints, which requires to work out, for given policy parameters, the subgame perfect
equilibria of the game starting at t = 1, characterized by ﬂrms colluding or deviating and by the choice
of revealing or not information to the AA. We ﬂrst consider the \revelation game" which is played
from t = 2 on if an investigation is opened by the AA. The following Lemma identiﬂes the conditions
for the existence of Nash equilibria in which ﬂrms cooperate or not with the AA.
Lemma 1 Let
1 ¡
(1 ¡ p)(ƒM ¡ ƒN)
pF ¡ R
· ~ –(p;F;R)( 2 )
Provided that an investigation has been opened, in the \revelation" game an equilibrium always exists
in which all ﬂrms reveal information.
If
1) pF < R or
2) pF ‚ R and – ‚ ~ –(p;F;R)
an equilibrium exists in which no ﬂrm reveals. If this latter exists, it Pareto dominates the equilibrium
outcome in which the ﬂrms reveal.
Proof: See Appendix. 2
5Figure 2.a below illustrates the critical locus of points ~ –: To the right of this curve, ﬂrms reveal
if an investigation has been opened by the AA. To the left of it, they do not. This curve, which always
passes through the upper right corner of the picture, rotates to the left as the reward from revealing
information increases (that is, the lower R) and the larger becomes the ﬂne F to be paid if found
guilty: in other words, revelation occurs for a wider set of parameters as the incentive to cooperate
with the AA is sharpened.
We can now consider the initial decision to join the proposed agreement or deviate at t=1.
Three possible outcomes can occur: ﬂrms might prefer not to collude (NC), since they expect an
immediate deviation. Alternatively, collusion may start, followed by the decision not to reveal (CNR)
or to reveal (CR) if an investigation is opened by the AA. To simplify the statement of the results, it












(1¡ ﬁ)(ƒD ¡ ƒN) ¡ ﬁR
· –CR(ﬁ;R): (4)
The following proposition identiﬂes the conditions on the discount factor – for the three outcomes
to occur.
Proposition 2 For given policy parameters (F;R;ﬁ;p):
† if –CR(ﬁ;R) • – • ~ –(p;F;R), ﬂrms collude and reveal if monitored (CR).
† if – ‚ maxf–NC(ﬁ;p;F); ~ –(p;F;R)g, ﬂrms collude and do not reveal if monitored (CNR).
† if –<minf–NC(ﬁ;p;F);– CR(ﬁ;R)g ﬂrms do not collude (NC).
Proof: See Appendix. 2
Figure 2.a below illustrates the line corresponding to –CR, for given values of ﬁ and R: this
locus does not depend on p (it is †at) sinc in the region to the right of ~ – ﬂrms cooperate with the
AA once an investigation is opened and p becomes irrelevant. Above the line, ﬂrms prefer to collude
even though they anticipate that, if an investigation is opened, collusion would collapse because ﬂrms
would reveal information to the AA. Below the line, ﬂrms, anticipating revelation, prefer to deviate,
and the collusive outcome never occurs.
Consider now –NC, which identiﬂes the regions where ﬂrms start colluding (above) or not (below).
For ﬁ =0o fp =0 ,w eh a v e–NC = –CR = ƒD¡ƒM
ƒD¡ƒN , and the condition for collusion amounts to
the \textbook" critical discount factor, which is in fact derived under the condition of no antitrust
enforcement. Positive values of ﬁ and p (and higher values of the full ﬂne F) increase –CR and make
the cartel harder to sustain, since the expected collusive proﬂts are reduced.
6Note also that the more generous the Leniency Program (the lower the reduced ﬂne R)t h e
lower –CR: if ﬂrms expect that in case an investigation is opened they have the possibility to reveal
information and get away with a small ﬂne, this will give an incentive to choose the collusive strategy.
In other words, a generous Leniency Policy might stimulate ex{ante collusion. (We shall come back
to this issue below.)
Figures 2.a and 2.b about here
The curves represented in Figure 2.a deﬂne, for a given ﬁ, the conditions that must hold for a
collusive agreement to emerge, and those which induce revelation or not if an inquiry is opened by
the AA. More precisely, if no Leniency Program is introduced (R = F) ﬂrms have no reason to reveal
information to the Authority if an investigation is opened, and the equilibrium outcomes would be
deﬂned uniquely by the line –NC: Above the line, ﬂrms would collude (CNR); below, they would not
(NC), because any proposed agreement would break down immediately. Reduced ﬂnes modify the
situation: in the region to the left of ~ – ﬂrms don’t reveal if monitored, and the same argument above
still applies. To the right of that curve, ﬂrms anticipate that they reveal information if monitored:
below –CR they prefer not to collude and above they initially collude and then reveal if monitored.
We can notice that the conditions for collusion are more demanding with respect to the standard
case when no AA operates: the critical discount factor needed for a collusive outcome is always higher
than (ƒD¡ƒM)=(ƒD¡ƒN)w h e nﬁ and p are positive. When a ﬂrm considers whether to join a cartel
or deviate, in fact, it evaluates the collusive proﬂts taking into account that with a certain probability
collusion will be detected, inducing a double loss: the ﬂne to be paid and the lost collusive proﬂts
from there on. The higher the probability of these losses, the lower the collusive proﬂts. Hence, we
need a higher and higher discount factor to balance the temptation to deviate.
To understand the role of Leniency Programs on the sustainability of collusion, consider what
happens when, starting with a situation in which no Leniency Program is used, we introduce reduced
ﬂnes. This has two eﬁects which are shown in Figure 2.a. On the one hand, the Leniency Program
might have an adverse, pro{collusive eﬁect. By reducing the expected value of the ﬂne to be paid if
an investigation is opened, the Leniency Program might give an incentive to collusion. This occurs in
the area (1) included between the dotted part of the curve –NC and the line –CR. In this region, no
collusion can be sustained in the industry if full ﬂnes are given (NC), but under a Leniency Program
ﬂrms would engage in collusion and, if monitored, they would reveal (CR) and pay the reduced ﬂne
R<F.
On the other hand, there exists an area (2) where collusion will break down (because the ﬂrms
reveal information) if the AA starts monitoring the industry (CR), whereas in the absence of a Leniency
Program collusion could stop only after a successful complete investigation (CNR). This is the area
comprised between the dotted part of the curve –NC and the curve ~ –.16.
We can now move to the analysis of the optimal policy, having identiﬂed the implementable
allocations. So far we have expressed the conditions for the diﬁerent equilibrium outcomes in the
16If the Leniency Program were unanticipated, ﬂrms would decide whether to collude or not on the basis of an expected
ﬂne R = F and therefore would not cooperate unless – ‚ –NC. When the leniency program is introduced unexpectedly,
collusion would break down in all the area below the curve ~ – (that is, (1) plus (2)), without any adverse eﬁect arising.
7space (p;–): this was useful because we obtained the conditions of cartel stability in terms of critical
discount factors, thereby allowing a comparison with the modern theory of collusion. To proceed with
the analysis of the optimal policy design, it is convenient to rewrite the critical loci found above in
the space (p;ﬁ) of policy parameters.
Firms would reveal if monitored if:
p ‚
ƒM ¡ ƒN + R(1¡ –)
ƒM ¡ ƒN + F(1–)
=~ p(–;R;F): (5)
Firms would prefer to collude rather than deviate, when they anticipate that the opening of an
investigation would result in collusion broken down by revelations, if:
ﬁ •
ƒM ¡ ƒD + –(ƒD ¡ ƒN)
–(ƒD ¡ ƒN + R)
= ﬁCR(–;R): (6)
Finally, collusion arises in the case where ﬂrms anticipate that no revelation would occur after the
opening of an investigation, if:
ﬁ •
(1 ¡ –)[ƒM ¡ ƒD + –(ƒD ¡ ƒN)]
–[pF(1¡ –)+p(ƒM ¡ ƒN)+ƒ D(1 ¡ –) ¡ ƒM + –ƒN]
= ﬁNC(–;p;F): (7)
The three loci above allow to deﬂne, in the space of policy parameters, three regions associated
with diﬁerent implementable allocations, in which ﬂrms do not collude (NC), collude and reveal if
monitored (CR) and collude and do not reveal (CNR):
ANC = f(ﬁ;p) 2 [0;1]2 j ﬁ ‚ maxfﬁNC(p);ﬁ CRgg (8)
ACNR = f(ﬁ;p) 2 [0; ~ p] £ [0;1] j ﬁ<ﬁ NC(p)gg (9)
ACR = f(ﬁ;p) 2 [0;ﬁ CR] £ [~ p;1]gg (10)
When no Leniency Program is introduced the only outcomes are NC, if (ﬁ;p) are above the ﬁNC
curve, or CNR otherwise. If R<Fthe threshold ~ p becomes lower than 1 and CR is an outcome if
ﬁ<ﬁ CR and p>~ p. Notice that ﬁNC(~ p)=ﬁCR, that is the upper left corner of the region associated
to CR shifts up along the ﬁNC curve as R is reduced. When R = 0 we obtain the widest CR region.
We ﬂnd also in the (ﬁ;p) space the same adverse eﬁect of Leniency Programs already discussed:
the intersection of ANC when R = F and ACR when R<Fis non empty. That means that there are
policy combinations which prevent collusion when full ﬂnes are given and that induce ﬂrms to collude
and reveal once a Leniency Program is introduced.
Moreover, if –<ƒD¡ƒM
ƒD¡ƒN , where the latter term is the standard critical discount factor for col-
lusion when no antitrust prosecution is considered, ﬁNC < 0a n dﬁCR < 0, i.e. the only admissible
outcome for any value of the policy parameters is NC. Figure 2.b illustrates the equilibrium outcomes
when –>ƒD¡ƒM
ƒD¡ƒN and R<F, and it is the dual of ﬂgure 2.a - see above.
We summarize the subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes of the supergame played by ﬂrms
for given policy parameters and discount factor – in the following proposition, which is the dual of
Proposition 2.
Proposition 3 Given the gains ƒM and ƒD speciﬂed above,
8† If the policy combination (ﬁ;p) 2 ANC there is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in which
ﬂrms will abstain ex{ante from collusion (NC).
† If (ﬁ;p) 2 ACNR there is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in which ﬂrms collude and don’t
reveal if monitored (CNR).
† If (ﬁ;p) 2 ACR there is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in which ﬂrms collude and reveal
if monitored (CR).I fR = F, ACR is an empty set.
The AA chooses (ﬁ;p;R)g iven the incentive compatibility constraints, summarized in Figure
2.b and Proposition 3, in order to maximize a utilitarian welfare function in which ﬂnes are pure
transfers. Let K = DWL=(1 ¡ –) be the discounted sum of the deadweight loss DWL, which can be
thought of as the net social beneﬂt from ppreventing collusion Moreover, let Wj be the present value
of the welfare gain if the policy induces the equilibrium outcome j = NC;CR;CNR. Then we have,
for given (ﬁ;p), WNC = K>W CR = ﬁK=(1 ¡ –(1 ¡ ﬁ)) >W CNR = ﬁpK=(1¡ –(1 ¡ ﬁ)).
It is useful to identify the (welfare) indiﬁerence curves for the policy problem in the (ﬁ;p) space:
if we do not introduce ﬂne reductions, in all the region ANC we have full deterrence ex-ante and the
associated welfare gains are K for all the policy parameters in the ANC region. In the region ACNR
the indiﬁerence curve for a level of welfare gains WCNR is ﬁ = WCNR(1 ¡ –)=(pK ¡ –WCNR), i.e. it
is a decreasing and convex curve in the (ﬁ;p) space: ex{post desistence in this case depends on both
ﬁ and p according to the trade{oﬁ described by the curve.
Figure 3 about here
Moreover, it is easy to show that the indiﬁerence curves in the ACNR region have a shape similar
to the ﬁNC curve as deﬂned in ( 7), which is the upper boundary of that region, and in the limit they
overlap with that curve. In fact, if we consider the indiﬁerence curves for given WCNR and the ﬁNC(p)
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The right hand side expression corresponds to the upper intercept of the ﬁNC(p) curve at ﬁ =1 ,
i.e. ﬁNC(^ p) = 1. Hence, looking at the expression above, if WCNR =^ pK the indiﬁerence curve
overlaps with the upper boundary of the ACNR region, that is with the ﬁNC(p). For WCNR < ^ pK
the indiﬁerence curve in the ACNR region shifts toward the origin.
When a Leniency Program is introduced, below the ANC region we have the ACR and ACNR
regions. The indiﬁerence curves across the region ACR are ﬁ =( 1¡ –)WCR=(K ¡ –WCR): those
curves are horizontal, since in the CR case ex{post desistence depends only on ﬁ. The same level of
welfare in the ACNR region can be obtained only if ﬁ is higher; that means that the indiﬁerence curve
is discontinuous at ~ p and jumps up as we move from the ACR to the ACNR region17.
17Notice that WCNR = WCR for the same ﬁ when p = 1. Hence, if we extend the WCNR indiﬁerence curve in the ACR
region up to p = 1 we ﬂnd the level of ﬁ such that WCR = WCNR and we are able to identify the level of the indiﬁerence
curve in the ACR region, as shown in ﬂgure 3.
9The iso{welfare curves in the ACNR and ACR regions do not identify a convex set of policy
parameters. We proceed therefore convexifying the indiﬁerence curves in the following way. Consider
an indiﬁerence curve in the ACNR and ACR region; draw a line which passes through the point of
discontinuity (ﬁ =( 1¡ –)WCR=(K ¡–WCR);p=~ p) and which is tangent to the indiﬁerence curve in
the ACNR region. Let the tangency point be e(WCNR); repeating this precedure for diﬁerent values
of WCNR an entire locus e(WCNR) is obtained. Deﬂne ECNR the subset of ACNR to the left of that
locus, which is represented in Figure 3. Notice that, constructing ECNR, we have excluded those
points on the indiﬁerence curves in the ACNR region which are dominated by a combination of policy
parameters in (at the boundary of) the ACR region, obtaining a convex set of policy parameters.
We can now analyze the optimal policies. According to the values of B;wﬁ and wp, i.e. the
position of the budget constraint B = wﬁﬁ + wpp in the (ﬁ;p) space, we can have diﬁerent solutions
to the optimal policy problem.
Proposition 4 Consider the optimal policies given the budget constraint.
† If the budget constraint is above or on the ﬁNC(p) curve, the optimal policy implements NC at
a tangency point between the budget constraint and the ﬁNC(p) curve, and the set of possible
equilibrium outcomes includes all the curve, i.e. ENC = f(ﬁ;p) j p 2 [0;1];ﬁ= ﬁNC(p)g.
† If the budget constraint is below the ﬁNC(p) curve the optimal policy implements either CR or
CNR.
{ In a CR equilibrium the optimal policy sets R =0 , p =~ p and ﬁ along the budget constraint,
and the policy combinations lie along the vertical line ~ p,i . e .i nt h es e tECR = f(ﬁ;p) j ﬁ 2
[0;ﬁ CR];p=~ pg.
{ In a CNR equilibrium the optimal policy combinations are at the tangency point between
the budget constraint and the indiﬁerence curve.
† If the budget constraint is tangent to an indiﬁerence curve in the ECNR region deﬂned above,
the optimal policy implements a CNR outcome; otherwise CR is the equilibrium outcome.
Proof: See Appendix. 2
Proposition 4 gives the conditions which in general allow to identify the optimal policies for
given budget constraint and it deﬂnes three sets of policy parameters which correspond to the diﬁerent
equilibrium outcomes, as represented in Figure 3. It is useful to consider the sequence of policy regimes
that are associated with lower and lower budget constraints. Notice that two possibile sequences can
arise, according to the way in which the budget constraint shrinks: either we move from a NC to a
CNR regime, if the budget constraint is initially very steep and the tangency point on the ﬁNC(p)
curve which implements the NC outcome lies in the neighborhood of the ECNR region, or we have,
for ￿atter budget constraints, a NC-CR-CNR sequence if the tangency point with the ﬁNC(p)c u r v e
is in its lower part. This latter case seems quite interesting and allows to get the intuition of the pros
and cons of the Leniency Programs.
Consider the optimal policies for parallel shifts of the budget constraint; for a relatively high
total endowment a NC outcome can be implemented at a tangency point with the ﬁNC(p)c u r v e :i n
10this case reduced ﬂnes would be harmful, inducing collusion (and revelation) when otherwise the AA
would be able to prevent collusion. When the budget constraint shifts downwards and lies below the
ANC curve, it is no longer possible to obtain ex-ante deterrence of collusion. In this case it is optimal to
implement a CR outcome by granting maximum ﬂne discounts and setting the policy parameters along
the ~ p vertical locus: intuitively, when the AA is only able to implement ex-post desistence, reduced
ﬂnes become appealing as a less costly way of proving and interrupting collusion. The implicit cost of
such a policy is the need to sink resources in order to make independent prosecution a credible threat
which induces revelation. As a consequence, when the total endowment is further reduced (the budget
constraint shifts further downwards), fewer and fewer resources are left for general monitoring, which
in the end determines the likelihood of interrupting collusion and the desirability of such a policy.
At some point, we ﬂnd that the (low) budget constraint becomes tangent to the iso{welfare curve
in the ECNR region: it means that we obtain a higher expected welfare moving to the region where
ﬂrms collude and do not reveal, abandoning the Leniency Program and changing the mix of policy
parameters in a more favourable way.
3 Alternative Leniency Rules
In this section we adapt the model to alternative Leniency Rules that have been adopted in the recent
experience in the US and in the European Union. The ﬂrst extension refers to the possibility of giving
reduced ﬂnes only if ﬂrms reveal information before an inquiry is opened by the AA. Another regime
assigns the reduction in ﬂnes only to the ﬂrst ﬂrm which oﬁers cooperation with the agency. Next, we
suggest that if only one speciﬂc ﬂrm is entitled to beneﬂt from a Leniency Program, this policy would
be even more successful.
3.1 Fine reductions only before the inquiry is opened
As mentioned in the introduction, the initial Leniency Program introduced in the US in 1978 entitled
ﬂrms with a reduction in ﬂnes only if the cooperation started before an inquiry was opened. On the
same line, the actual regime chosen in the EU with the July 1996 Notice is more favourable for ﬂrms
who reveal information before the AA has opened an o–cial investigation. It is therefore interesting
to analyze whether this rule can be justiﬂed in terms of enforcement eﬁectiveness. We show that this
is not the case.
Let us consider a \ﬂne reductions only before an inquiry is opened" regime. The corresponding
game structure is described for the general case of n ﬂrms in the following18:
t = 0 : The AA sets the policy parameters ﬁ;p;R which are observed by the ﬂrms.
t =1 :F i r m si =1 ;::;n decide whether to collude or deviate and realize the associated payoﬁs.
t = 2 : At the beginning of the period, ﬂrms simultaneously choose whether to reveal the existence of
the cartel to the AA, beneﬂtting of reduced ﬂnes, or not; if no ﬂrm reveals, the AA opens an
investigation with probability ﬁ 2 [0;1], proving them guilty with probability p 2 [0;1]. Then,
payoﬁs are realized.
18The payoﬁs in the diﬁerent outcomes are similar to the model analysed above, and will be omitted here in the
description of the game.
11t>2 : if up to the previous period the AA has not started an investigation, the game restarts as from
t = 2, etc.19
Consider ﬂrst the subgame starting at t = 1 after a decision to collude. To ﬂnd the conditions
under which not revealing is an equilibrium, we have to compare the payoﬁ from revealing when the
other ﬂrms do not reveal, namely ƒN
1¡– ¡ R, with the payoﬁ from not revealing when the other ﬂrms
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It is simple algebra to check that this payoﬁ is higher than (p( ƒN
1¡– ¡ F)+( 1¡ p)ƒM
1¡–), the
expected payoﬁ from not revealing after the investigation has been opened, which was the relevant
one under the rule analyzed in the previous section. Since the payoﬁ from revealing is the same in
both cases, it follows that the equilibrium where ﬂrms do not reveal is more likely to occur when the
Leniency Program is applied only for revelations before the inquiry is opened. In other words, the
curve ~ – moves to the right and collusion is less likely to be broken by revelations in this regime. This
is hardly surprising, because the probability of the event \being found guilty and thus ﬂned" is lower
before seeing if the industry will be monitored than after an investigation is actually opened.
We have now to consider if the Leniency Program might change the ex{ante incentives of ﬂrms to
collude. It turns out that there would never be collusion in the industry when ﬂrms expect that there
would be revelation of information to the AA in the following period: this implies that an equilibrium
in which ﬂrms choose to collude and reveal does not exist. In fact, by colluding when expecting the
cartel to be broken by information given to the AA, a ﬂrm would get Vc =ƒ M + –(ƒN=(1¡ –) ¡ R).
By deviating, it would get Vd =ƒ D + –ƒN=(1 ¡ –). Since ƒD > ƒM and R ‚ 0, it follows that
Vc <V d.
In the case, considered in the previous section, where ﬂrms were entitled to ﬂne discounts
after the opening of an investigation, the expected proﬂt from collusion decreases when the event
\opening of an investigation" realizes, leading ﬂrms to reveal information to the agency. In the case
we are considering here, instead, nothing new happens between the moment when the ﬂrms decide on
collusion and the moment when they are asked to cooperate with the authorities to break down the
cartel.
Our analysis reveals that if Leniency Programs are to be eﬁective in breaking down cartels, they
should be extended to beneﬂt ﬂrms which reveal after the industry is put under monitoring. Since
proving ﬂrms guilty of collusion is a very lengthy and complex issue, which does not always end up
with the ﬂrms being condemned, a great amount of resources can be saved and a ﬂnal positive outcome
guaranteed by ensuring that ﬂrms have the proper incentives to collaborate with the AA even after
an investigation has been started.
19Allowing ﬂrms to choose whether to reveal or not before an investigation is opened at any period would not change
the results.
12This result is consistent with the US experience, where initially the Leniency Program was used
only for ﬂrms which spontaneously oﬁered evidence before the inquiry was opened by the AA. In this
initial regime the program was quite ineﬁective while, once allowed in 1993 for reduced ﬂnes even
after the inquiry was opened, the number of cases in which ﬂrms cooperate with the judges increased
signiﬂcantly. In the 1994 Annual Report of the Antitrust Division it is stressed that in the ﬂrst
year of the new regime \an average of one corporation per month come forward with information on
unilateral conspiracies, compared to an average of one per year under the previous policy. The policy
thus allowed the Division to extend the reach of its criminal enforcement activities with relatively
little expenditure of resources"20.
According to our results, the new regulation on Leniency Programs21 adopted by the EU should
be widened. The regulation states that ﬂrms which denounce a cartel before the Commission has
opened an investigation are entitled to a reduction of 75{100% of the ﬂnes. Firms which denounce
a cartel after that a \veriﬂcation" has been opened are entitled to a 50{75% reduction of the ﬂnes,
but only if those veriﬂcations had not been fruitful and had not led to the opening of a procedure.
Basically, this means that Leniency Programs are opened only for ﬂrms operating in industries which
are not under the scrutiny of the AA. This narrows too much the scope of the application of the
regulation, and fails to provide the ﬂrms with enough incentives for revealing information which can
be useful to break the cartel.22
3.2 Only the ¯rst comer obtains a ¯ne reduction
The criteria that determine which ﬂrms can receive the beneﬂts of a reduced ﬂne have been restricted
in diﬁerent ways both in the US and in the EU experience. An interesting case is where only the ﬂrst
ﬂrm which oﬁers evidence is given a ﬂne reduction, as it is the case in the EU regulation.
In this case the game structure is the same as in our initial model. The only diﬁerence is that
if all ﬂrms decide to reveal information to the judges, as it happens in a subgame perfect equilibrium
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(11)
where n is the number of ﬂrms in the cartel: every ﬂrm is ex{ante the ﬂrst one to disclose information to
the AA with probability 1=n. Notice, however, that when we check for the existence of an equilibrium
in which no ﬂrm reveals, a deviating ﬂrm obtains the reduced ﬂne R for sure, being the only one which
cooperates with the judges. Hence, the condition for an equilibrium in which no ﬂrm reveals is – ‚ ~ –,
exactly as in the case treated above.
Moreover, it is easy to see that if an equilibrium exists in which no ﬂrm reveals if monitored, it
also Pareto dominates the equilibrium in which all ﬂrms cooperate with the AA.
20Antitrust Division (1994), p.6{7.
21See O–cial Journal of the European Communities, Series C, 207, 18{7{1998.
22Taken literally, our analysis would also suggest that when ﬂrms reveal they should always receive a zero ﬂne (R =0 ) ,
since this would give them the greatest incentive to denounce the cartel. However, we are assuming that collaborating
with the AA is a binary variable. Either one does not collaborate, or if it does it can give all the information necessary
to prove the participation in the cartel of all the ﬂrms. In reality, the type of information that ﬂrms can provide would
be more of a continuous variable, and tuning the ﬂne reductions to the quality of the information revealed makes sense.
13Consider now the decision of ﬂrms on collusion at t =1 :i f– ‚ ~ – ﬂrms will not reveal if monitored
and everything is as in the basic model. However, if –<~ –, revelation will follow the opening of an
investigation, but ﬂrms’ incentives to collude are modiﬂed in the present regime, since the expected
payoﬁ if monitored is lower than in the previous case where all ﬂrms could beneﬂt from the Leniency
Program.
One can check that ﬂrms will abstain from collusion iﬁ
– ‚
ƒD ¡ ƒM





It is immediate to notice that –CR <– I
CR, that is, the region of parameters that induce ﬂrms to abstain
from collusion is larger than in the previous \all ﬂrms get the reduction" regime | see Figure 4.
Figure 4 about here
The intuition of this result is as follows: in the more restrictive set of rules analyzed in this
section, the expected reduction in ﬂnes is smaller when all ﬂrms choose to cooperate with the judges,
although it is equivalent when we consider the incentive for a ﬂrm to cheat the partners when they
do not reveal. Hence, when ﬂrms anticipate that they all will confess if monitored, they expect
higher sanctions. Consequently, in some cases they ﬂnd it less attractive to collude and reveal as
an alternative to deviating from the beginning and avoiding the ﬂne. The regime therefore is able
to partially reduce the ex{ante incentive to collusion without reducing the power of the program in
making ﬂrms denounce a cartel after an inquiry is opened.
This case suggests an alternative rule which might increase the eﬁectiveness of a Leniency
Program, by further reducing the ex{ante incentive of engaging in collusion induced by the expected
reduction in ﬂnes.
3.3 Only a speci¯c ¯rm receives a ¯ne reduction23
As we have repeatedly emphasized, a Leniency Program in￿uences ﬂrms in two ways. The ﬂrst is
that it stimulates ex{post breaking of the cartel via revelation of information to the AA; the second
(adverse eﬁect) is to increase the incentive of collusion via a reduction in the punishment in case of
being found guilty. We have also seen that granting a reduction in ﬂnes only to the ﬂrst ﬂrm which
reveals works because it leaves unchanged the ﬂrst eﬁect but reduces the second. The eﬁectiveness of
the Leniency Program could be increased even further by increasing asymmetries in the industry and
specifying ex{ante that only a speciﬂc ﬂrm could be entitled to the LP, no matter the way in which
such a ﬂrm is selected. The way of interpreting this rule is that of deﬂning ex{ante a set of parameters
which allow all the participants in each speciﬂc situation to identify a single ﬂrm entitled to a reduced
ﬂne24: the ﬂrms involved in the cartel, applying the rule, are able to work out which one will be the
ﬂrm selected. Denote this ﬂrm with a number, say 1. The conditions under which revelation occurs
are the same as usual: If –<~ –, the cartel would break because ﬂrm 1 denounces it. On the other
23We thank P. Rey for suggesting this extension.
24For instance, it might be the ﬂrm located in the smallest city, or the last one in alphabetical order, etc.
14hand, the conditions under which ex{ante collusion occurs will change. For the n¡ 1 ﬂrms which are
not entitled to the Leniency Program, the condition for taking part in the collusion will be:
– ‚
ƒD ¡ ƒM
(1¡ ﬁ)(ƒD ¡ ƒN) ¡ ﬁF
· –F
CR (13)
For ﬂrm 1, the condition is laxer:
– ‚
ƒD ¡ ƒM
(1 ¡ ﬁ)(ƒD ¡ ƒN) ¡ ﬁR
(14)
However, since all the ﬂrms must ﬂnd it convenient to take part in collusion, the latter condition
does not play any role, while the former is binding and determines the existence of collusion. Also,
notice that –F
CR >– I
CR >– CR | see Figure 4. In other words, if the authority targets the Leniency
Program to a speciﬂc ﬂrm, it will be able to reduce the ex{ante adverse eﬁect of it without decreasing
the ex{post incentive to reveal information. Hence, collusion becomes less likely because the ﬂrms
excluded from the program ﬂnd it less appealing to engage in a cartel which includes a likely cheater25.
4 Heterogeneous Cartels
So far we have considered homogeneous cartels, in which the payoﬁs in each possible outcome were the
same across partners. Notice however that, in all our arguments, if the participants have heterogenous
payoﬁs and they know the payoﬁs of the partners in each possible outcome, the equilibria are governed
by the conditions of one of the ﬂrms, the one whose constraints bind. This decisive agent is the point
of reference for the others, whether they expect such ﬂrm to deviate or to reveal information after
colluding, and drives the equilibrium conditions of the entire cartel. Hence, in a sense, our previous
analysis allows to consider heterogeneous ﬂrms within a cartel, but it assumes that in each cartel in
the economy such a decisive agent is always the same. It is therefore interesting to consider the case
in which the cartels are truly heterogeneous, in the sense that the participants may diﬁer in payoﬁs
and the decisive partner may be diﬁerent across cartels.
We consider in this setting the design of an optimal enforcement policy which cannot be made
conditional on cartel’s type, due to informational and/or institutional restrictions. Hence, the AA
has to design a single, general policy facing many diﬁerent industries, characterized by heterogeneous
market conditions and potential gains from collusion. In this case, the policy implemented will induce
diﬁerent eﬁects in the various industries, reaching a more or less eﬁective deterrence of collusion and
inducing diﬁerent types to choose diﬁerent reactions: hence we might have some cartel types colluding
and not revealing while others will prefer not to join the cartel; or we might have all types colluding,
but only a subset of them revealing information when monitored, etc. Hence, the diﬁerent eﬁects
that we have identiﬂed in the previous sections will be combined in a richer way once the AA faces
heterogenous types.
From the previous analysis we already know that the incentive compatibility constraints for
given policy parameters depend on two variables of cartel’s type: ƒM ¡ ƒN and ƒD ¡ ƒN. Hence,
25Of course, leniency rules which limit the applicability of the ﬂne reduction to only one ﬂrm will result in a larger
amount of money collected through ﬂnes. In a world where non{distortionary transfers are not available, this would be
an additional advantage of such rules.
15multiple types would require to deal with a bivariate distribution, related to the gains from collusion
and from deviation. To maintain the analysis simple, we assume in this section Bertrand competition
(with constant marginal costs ) in the non{cooperative equilibrium: hence ƒN =0a n dƒ D = nƒM:
the gains from collusion are now perfectly correlated to those from deviation, and we can consider
a univariate distribution of types. Cartel types refer to the gains from collusion, due for example
to diﬁerent marginal cost levels, with ƒM 2 [ƒM;ƒM]; the AA does not observe cartel types but
knows their distribution g(ƒM), and is not able to condition the policy chosen to some observable
that can make it contingent on a message. In other words, the AA sets a single combination of policy
parameters taking into account that there exist many cartel types in the economy.
Under the assumption of Bertrand competition the standard critical discount factor when an-
titrust is absent, –⁄ =( ƒ D ¡ ƒM)=(ƒD ¡ ƒN), is (n ¡ 1)=n. We can rewrite the relevant loci as:
ﬁCR =
ƒM(1 ¡ n + n–)
ƒMn–
=( – ¡ –⁄)=–
which does not depend on cartel’s type,
ﬁNC(p)=
(1 ¡ –)n(– ¡ –⁄)ƒM




(ƒM + F(1¡ –))
which are both increasing in ƒM. Moreover, ﬁCR is always above ﬁNC at p = 1. Hence, when R<F
we can distinguish 5 regions which are represented in ﬂgure 5.
Figure 5 about here
In region A all types choose CNR and the corresponding welfare is WA =
ﬁp
1¡–+ﬁ–E(K) where
E(K) is the expected value of the gains from deterrence given the distribution of types g(ƒM). In
region B all types choose CR with WB = ﬁ
1¡–+ﬁ–E(K) while in E all types abstain from collusion and
welfare is WE = E(K). In region C some types choose CNR and others CR: let ƒC
M b et h et y p ew h o s e
~ p equals the p chosen by the AA in region C: all types lower than ƒC
M collude and reveal while the
cartels more proﬂtable collude and don’t reveal. The expected welfare is therefore
WC =
ﬁ











Analogously, in region D lower types abstain from collusion and higher types collude and don’t reveal,
with the threshold type ƒD
M such that the actual policy combination in D lies on that type’s ﬁNC(p)












When R = F only regions A,D and E exist, deﬂned by the set of ﬁNC(p) curves which extend
up to p =1 .
16The analysis of the optimal policy proceeds in three steps, which are developed analytically in
the Appendix. First, the iso{welfare curves in each of the ﬂve regions A{E are derived; then, we check
how the same welfare level is obtained passing (eventually) from one region to the neighbouring one,
distinguishing whether ﬂne reductions are given or not; ﬂnally, comparing the two cases, it is selected
whether reduced ﬂnes R allow to save enforcement costs, deﬂning a set of iso{welfare curves along
which Leniency Programs are optimally used.
The result of this analysis is shown in ﬂgure 6.a: the lower bold curve is the iso{welfare (cost
minimizing) curve setting R = 0, which passes through the regions A{C{B. The upper bold curve
passing in the D{C{B regions entains the use of reduced ﬂnes only in a subset of the B and C regions.
The policy combinations (R;ﬁ;p) which minimize the cost of reaching the same expected welfare are
summarized in a map of iso{welfare curves which are not convex: as before, we have to convexify them
excluding from the set of possible equilibrium outcomes those policy combinations which belong to
the non{convex portions of the indiﬁerence curves.
Given the map of indiﬁerence curves that minimize the cost of a given expected welfare, we
exclude those portions which can never be selected given our linear budget constraint26.F o r t h e
indiﬁerence curves in the A region we obtain a subset of points ECNR analogous to the one obtained
in the single type case already discussed. In region C we ﬂnd a subset of points ECR
CNR in which some
types choose CR and higher types choose CNR. In region B we select only the boundary to the left,
which corresponds to the ECR
CNR case when all types opt for CR. A subset of D, ENC
CNR is obtained
where low type select NC and high types chooase CNR, and ﬂnally from region E we select the lower
bound. Once excluded the non{convex portions of the iso{welfare curves, the optimal policies for given
budget constraint can be established along the same lines of Proposition 4’s proof. We summarize the
results in the following Proposition, which is respresented in ﬂgure 6.b.
Proposition 5 Consider the optimal policy under asymmetric information given the budget constraint
and the distribution of cartel types.
† If the budget constraint passes through region E, the optimal policy implements NC for all types
at a tangency point between the budget constraint and the ﬁNC(p) curve of the highest type.
† If the budget constraint passes through region D and is tangent to an indiﬁerence curve in ENC
CNR,
the optimal policy is at the tangency point with no ﬂne reduction, and implements a CNR{NC
outcome according to the diﬁerent types.
† If the budget constraint passes through region A and is tangent to an indiﬁerence curve in ECNR,
the optimal policy is at the tangency point and implements CNR for all types.
† If the budget constraint passes through C and is tangent to an indiﬁerence curve in ECR
CNR,t h a t
is the optimal policy and implements a CNR-CR outcome.
† In all the other cases the optimal policy implements CR for all types setting p equal to the ~ p of
the highest type along the budget constraint.
26Any convex budget set, as that obtained under the assumption of decreasing returns to enforcement, would allow a
similar exercise.
17Figures 6.a and 6.b about here
We can give an explanation of the result above considering the sequence of optimal policies when
the budget constraint becomes steeper and steeper as a result of an increase in the cost of independent
prosecution (higher wp). For low values of wp the policy implements full deterrence ex{ante for all
types. As the budget constraint rotates toward the origin we initially move to a CNR{NC mixed
outcome with no ﬂne reduction, in which the more proﬂtable cartels are not deterred. Granting ﬂne
discounts in this case would shift low types from NC to CR: the pro{collusive eﬁect of Leniency
Programs would dominate reducing welfare. However, when the fraction of low types which choose
NC shrinks further, reduced ﬂnes are introduced, inducing all types to collude and reveal. In this case
the improvement in prosecution allowed by reduced ﬂnes becomes predominant. A further increase
in wp moves the equilibrium outcome in the ECR
CNR region with an increasing portion of high types
that choose CNR while low types collude and reveal. The implicit cost of the Leniency Programs,
which forces the AA to commit resources to independent prosecution to make it a credible threat,
becomes heavier and heavier as the resources left to open inquiries decrease and as the fraction of
types which are induced to reveal shrinks. In the end we move to the ECNR region, abandoning the
Leniency Program. Hence, the optimal policy is determined, in a sense, by the relative importance of
the pro{welfare eﬁect of Leniency Program, that allows to obtain more eﬁective ex{post desistence,
and the welfare decreasing eﬁects of reduced ﬂnes: the incentive to collude (and reveal) instead of
abstaining from collusion, and the need to sink resources to make independent prosecution credible,
which reduces the probability of opening an inquiry and of obtaining ex{post desistence.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have analyzed the eﬁects of Leniency Programs on the incentives of ﬂrms to collude and
to reveal information that helps the Antitrust Authority to prove illegal behaviour. The benchmark
regime gives to any ﬂrm a reduction in ﬂnes even if revelation occurs after an investigation is opened.
We show that reducing the expected ﬂnes may induce a pro{collusive reaction: combinations of policy
parameters which, without Leniency Programs, would prevent collusion, may induce ﬂrms to collude
(and reveal if monitored) when ﬂne reductions are given. Hence, if the resources available to the AA
are su–cient to prevent collusion using full ﬂnes, Leniency Programs should not be used.
However, when the AA has limited resources, Leniency Programs may be optimal in a second
best perspective. Fine reductions, inducing ﬂrms to reveal information once an investigation is opened,
increase the probability of ex{post desistence and the expected welfare gains. The optimal scheme
requires maximum ﬂne reductions and a shift of resources from prosecution to monitoring.
A ﬂxed amount of resources, however, must be committed in any case to make independent
prosecution a credible threat, since no ﬂrm would reveal if it expects that the AA is unable to prove
them guilty. When independent prosecution is very costly, too few resources are left to general
monitoring, which in the end determines the eﬁectiveness of Leniency Programs. In this case it may
become more convenient to shift back to a full ﬂnes regime with a more favourable mix of policy
parameters.
We have then compared our benchmark regime with alternative sets of rules: the ﬂrst allows
to give ﬂne reductions only to ﬂrms which cooperate with the Antitrust Authority before an inquiry
18is opened, as initially established in the US policy in 1978, and similar to the approach followed by
the EC Notice on the non-imposition of ﬂnes, and we proved this regime to be inferior with respect
to our benchmark case. We have then considered other rules which restrict the set of the ﬂrms that
can beneﬂt from a Leniency Program. We showed that by granting a ﬂne reduction only to the ﬂrst
ﬂrm which cooperates with the AA the perverse pro{collusive eﬁect of the Leniency Program would
be reduced without softening the incentives to reveal information. Better still, the AA might target a
speciﬂc ﬂrm and allow only this one to beneﬂt from the reduction. The intuition for this result, which
makes the Leniency Program even more eﬁective, lies in the asymmetry that the policy introduces
among otherwise identical ﬂrms, between the entitled ﬂrm and the excluded ones: the latter would
more often prefer to abstain from collusion rather than join a cartel together with a likely cheater.
Finally, the case of multiple cartel types has been considered: the AA is assumed to be unable,
for informational or institutional reasons, to implement Leniency Programs contingent on cartel’s type,
and therefore has to set general rules. For instance, the AA cannot shape the policy to the conditions
of each speciﬂc industry, but has to choose a general rule of behaviour, obtaining diﬁerent eﬁects
in diﬁerent industries. Then, according to the position of the budget constraint in the set of policy
combinations, we characterized the optimal policy: it turns out that the policy parameters and the
regime of full or reduced ﬂnes are chosen according to the relative weight of the three eﬁects described
above, where the weights depend on the share of types which choose the diﬁerent equilibrium outcomes
(no collusion; collusion; collusion and revelation).
We believe that, despite the simple setting, our paper sheds some light on the desirable features
of leniency programs, and suggests some changes in the EC leniency policy. First of all, if it is optimal
to use a leniency program (as in the realistic case where the antitrust agency has limited resources),
then the program should be as generous and certain as possible with the ﬂrms which provide fresh
evidence that establishes the existence of a cartel. In contrast, the EC policy of keeping some degree
of discretionality instead of granting automatic and total reduction of ﬂnes even to those ﬂrms which
fulﬂl all the (strict) conditions laid down in the EC Notice undermines the success of the leniency
program, as it does not give certainty to the prospective cooperating ﬂrm and reduces the incentive
to break the cartel.
Likewise, some of the conditions required by the EC policy are too strict. For instance, a ﬂrm
must \maintain continuous and complete co{operation throughout the investigation" to be entitled to
have a very substantial reduction (more than 75%) of the ﬂne. This has led the Commission to give
only a 50% reduction to a ﬂrm, Tate & Lyle, which had spontaneously brought conclusive evidence of
a cartel to the attention of the Commission (at a time when the Commission did not even suspect the
existence of an agreement), but had later (partially) contested some of the allegations made by the
Commission27. The strict wording and application of the Notice will reduce the incentive of the ﬂrms
to reveal information28.
Furthermore, our analysis indicates that a leniency program should be equally applicable to
information disclosed before and after an investigation has started, whereas the EC policy does not
27This is the case \British Sugar", EC Decision of 14 October 1998, published in the O–cial Journal of the EC, L76,
22 March 1999.
28Hornsby and Hunter (1997) also point out that the ﬂrms do not have enough incentives to cooperate under the
EC policy. Part of the problem is also due to the fact that the Notice cannot provide immunity from civil proceedings.
Admission of an infringement leads to a formal Commission Decision on which an action for damages can be built, without
the plaintiﬁ having to prove the infringement again. This problem does not exist in the US, where the cooperating ﬂrms
can resort to a consent decree.
19create enough incentives for post{investigation disclosure of information. It gives only 50{75% reduc-
tion of the ﬂnes for cooperation after an investigation has been undertaken already but only if such an
investigation has failed to provide su–cient material for initiating a procedure leading to a decision.
The US experience (where after the 1993 policy revision a corporation is granted leniency after
an investigation has begun provided that \the Division, at the time the corporation comes in, does
not yet have evidence against the company that is likely to result in a sustainable conviction" | point
B.2.) clearly shows that extension of the leniency program to post{investigation amnesty (along with
the automatic granting of the amnesty) is a crucial ingredient for success: \...under the old policy
on average only one corporation per year applied for amnesty," (Spratling (1998, page 2) whereas
under the revised policy, \Amnesty applications over the past year have been coming in at the rate of
approximately two per month" (Spratling (1999, page 2).
So far, the leniency program of the EC has been applied to a very reduced number of cases,
since its introduction in the end of 1996. There was no case in 1997 and only four in 199829.W e
believe that granting higher and automatic reductions of ﬂnes and extending the leniency program to
after{investigation cooperation would greatly increase the success of this policy.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
If a ﬂrm reveals, it gets a payoﬁ of ƒN=(1 ¡ –) ¡ R independently of the action chosen by the other
ﬂrms. If a ﬂrm does not reveal any information but at least one ﬂrm does, then the former ﬂrm
receives a payoﬁ of ƒN=(1 ¡ –) ¡ F. Hence, it is always (weakly) better to reveal if the other ﬂrms
are expected to reveal, which establishes the existence of the \revelation" equilibrium. Finally, if no








21If a ﬂrm expects the others not to reveal, the best reply is trivially not to reveal if pF < R.I f
pF ‚ R, when the other ﬂrms don’t reveal, a ﬂrm prefers not to reveal as well if the payoﬁ above is
higher than ƒN=(1 ¡ –) ¡ F, which simpliﬂes to – ‚ ~ –(p;F;R). Hence, in this case a \no revelation"
equilibrium exists. Moreover, the same inequality implies that the \no revelation" equilibrium gives
higher payoﬁs to all ﬂrms than the \revelation" equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 2
We consider the decision to collude or deviate in both cases, when ﬂrm will decide to reveal if inves-
tigated, and when they will prefer not to cooperate with the AA.
† Case 1: –<~ –. In this case ﬂrms reveal if an investigation is opened by the AA. Deﬂne ƒR as




¡ R)+( 1¡ ﬁ)(ƒM + –ƒR)
from which we obtain:
ƒR =
(1 ¡ ﬁ)ƒM + ﬁ( ƒN
1¡– ¡ R)
1 ¡ –(1¡ ﬁ)
If a ﬂrm decides to set the collusive price, then its expected discounted payoﬁ will be:
VCR =ƒ M + –ƒR =
ƒM + –ﬁ( ƒN
1¡– ¡ R)
1 ¡ –(1 ¡ ﬁ)
If instead a ﬂrm decides to deviate from the collusive strategy, then its payoﬁ is given by:
VD =ƒ D +
–ƒN
1 ¡ –
Collusion can arise if VCR ‚ VD, that is if the following condition is satisﬂed:
– ‚
ƒD ¡ ƒM
(1¡ ﬁ)(ƒD ¡ ƒN) ¡ ﬁR
· –CR(ﬁ;R): (16)
† Case 2: – ‚ ~ –. In this case, ﬂrms anticipate that even if an investigation is started, no ﬂrm will
reveal any information. Collusive outcome will be obtained unless the AA can prove the ﬂrms
guilty of collusion.




¡ F)+( 1¡ p)(
ƒM
1 ¡ –
) ]+( 1¡ ﬁ)(ƒM + –ƒNR)
We can then obtain:
ƒNR =
ﬁ[p( ƒN
1¡– ¡ F)+( 1¡ p)(ƒM
1¡–)] + (1 ¡ ﬁ)ƒM
1 ¡ –(1 ¡ ﬁ)
If a ﬂrm follows the collusive strategy its expected discounted payoﬁ is given by:





1 ¡ –(1 ¡ ﬁ)
As before, a ﬂrm which deviates obtains a payoﬁ:
VD =ƒ D +
–ƒN
1 ¡ –
The inequality VCNR ‚ VD implicitly deﬂnes the locus of points –NC = –NC(ﬁ;p;F).
Proof of Proposition 4
We proceed in two steps: ﬂrst we show, for each given outcome NC, CR, CNR, which is the associated
optimal policy; second, we show the conditions under which a particular outcome is better than the
others. If a NC outcome is implemented, we can have two cases: either the budget constraint is
above the lower boundary of the ANC region or it is tangent: in the latter case the tangency point
with the ﬁNC curve is trivially the optimal solution; if the budget constraint is above that curve, the
tangency point can still be suggested under a cost saving argument. In this case we set R = F since
granting ﬂne discounts would shrink the ANC region. If a CR outcome is implemented, the welfare
gain depends only on ﬁ, which therefore must be maximized: we can therefore set R = 0, shifting to
the left the ~ p threshold, and setting p =~ p; with p at its lowest level in the ACR region we can set
ﬁ = B=wﬁ ¡ (wp=wﬁ)~ p along the budget constraint. Finally if a CNR outcome is chosen, a tangency
point between the budget constraint and the indiﬁerence curve in the ACNR region must be chosen.
Consider now the choice among the three outcomes: since WNC is always dominant for any
set of policy parameters, if the budget constraint is not below the ﬁNC(p) curve, NC is the optimal
outcome implemented. The choice between a CR and a CNR outcome is more complex, since both
WCNR and WCR depend on the associated policy parameters, which, in turn, are diﬁerent at the
optimal points in the two regimes. Suppose the tangency point in the ACNR region belongs to the
subset ECNR: from the deﬂnition of ECNR, even if the budget constraint in its lower portion reaches
the ACR region, it passes through indiﬁerence curves lower than the initial one: hence, picking the
tangency point in the ECNR region and implementing a CNR outcome is the optimal policy. On the
contrary, if the tangency point is in ACNR but not in ECNR, the budget constraint reaches the ACR
at a higher indiﬁerence curve, and a CR outcome is optimal.
The iso{welfare curves with heterogeneous cartel types
In the following three Lemmas we identify the iso{welfare curves when the AA faces heterogeneous
cartels.
Lemma 6 The iso{welfare curves in each of the ﬂve regions have the following pattern:
† in E all the policy combination give the same welfare;
† in A and D they replicate the shape of the ﬁNC(p) curves;
† in B they are horizontal;
23† in C they are decreasing;
Proof: Since WE does not depend on the policy parameters, all the region correspond to the
same expected welfare. In region A all types choose CNR. From our analysis of the single type case
we already know that the iso{welfare curves when no type colludes have a shape similar to the ﬁNC
curves (one for each type) and in the limit overlap with those. Hence, in region A the indiﬁerence
curves replicate the ﬁNC curves shape. In region D high types choose CNR and lower types choose
NC: as long as we move along the ﬁNC curve of type ƒD
N, the threshold type does not change and the
ﬂrst term in WD is unchanged as well; moreover, we know that moving along a ﬁNC curve we keep the
expected welfare for types choosing CNR constant. We conclude that the indiﬁerence curves in region
D correspond to the ﬁNC curves through it. In region B all types choose CR and the expected welfare
depends only on ﬁ, i.e. we have ￿at iso{welfare curves. Finally, in the C region high types select CNR
and low types CR: since WC increases when ﬁ is higher (more frequent revelation) as well as when p
increases (more eﬁective prosecution and more types induced to reveal), the iso{welfare curve in the
C region must be decreasing. 2
Notice that when no Leniency Program is used, only the regions A, D and E exist, and the
result above states that all the curves in A (or D) never pass through another region. Hence, the
three relevant sets of indiﬁerence curves are completely deﬂned. When R<Fall the ﬂve regions
A{E exist; the Lemma above deﬂnes the iso{welfare curves in each region, but now the iso{welfare
curves in A (D) eventually continue through region C and B. Hence, we have to carefully check how
the iso{welfare curves behave moving from one region to the other.
Lemma 7 Consider the case R<F. The iso{welfare curves passing through the regions A{C{B are
continous and kinked at the boundaries of the A and B regions. The iso{welfare curves passing through
the region D{C{B discountinously shift to the right passing from D to C.
Proof: We start by identifying the indiﬁerence curves that pass through the A{C{B regions.
We already know, borrowing from the analysis of the single type case, that the iso{welfare curve jumps
down from A to B, when all types choose CNR and then CR: however, from the deﬂnitions of the
expected welfare we can notice that WC tends to WA or WB as the threshold type ƒC
M tends to ƒM or
ƒM. Hence, the indiﬁerence curves are now continuous; it is easy to check also that they are kinked
at the boundaries of the A and B regions, with the indiﬁerence curve steeper in C than in the other
two regions30.
Consider next the indiﬁerence curves passing through the D{C{B regions: we already established
that in D the curves replicate the ﬁNC curves shape, with some types choosing CNR and others NC;
once moving into the C regions, some types still select CNR while others CR. Since the welfare
associated to NC is higher than that when CR occurs, it must be that, moving from region D to
region C along a iso{welfare curve, less types choose CNR. That requires a discontinuous jump to the
right of the iso{welfare curve once entering in the C region. 2
30The concavity or convexity of the indiﬁerence curve in C cannot be stated in general, since it depends on the
distribution of types g(ƒM). In what follows we consider the case of concave indiﬁerence curves, while the extension to
the convex case is left to the reader.
24Figure 6.a shows the two cases of indiﬁerence curves, one through A{C{B and the other through
D{C{B. In the two Lemmas above we have completely characterized the iso{welfare curves when a
Leniency Program is introduced and when it is not. Our next step is to verify when it is convenient to
oﬁer reduced ﬂnes in order to reach a certain expected welfare. This exercise correponds to comparing
the iso{welfare curves in the two cases, selecting in the diﬁerent regions the lower one.
Lemma 8 When the iso{welfare curve with R =0passes through the A{C{B regions,i ti sa l w a y s
optimal to use the leniency Programs. When the iso{welfare curve with R =0lies in the D{C{B
region, the Leniency Programs are optimal only in a subset of the C and B regions.
Proof: Since R = 0 is the more eﬁective way of inducing CR, we compare the case R = F
and R = 0, selecting the lower of the two iso{welfare curves. Since in A and D the iso{welfare curves
are the same in both regimes, our problem amounts to selecting the lower curve in regions C and B.
This can be done by distinguishing the case in which the indiﬁerence curve with ﬂne reduction passes
through the A{C{B region and that in which it lies in the D{C{B areas. Comparing the full and
reduced ﬂnes indiﬁerence curves is immediate for the A{C{B case: in the A region they overlap while
in the C and B region the iso{welfare curve is lower when R = 0, as shown in ﬂgure 6.a. Hence, the
iso{welfare curve through A{C{B is that identiﬂed when the Leniency Program is used.
More complex is the comparison of the indiﬁerence curves with and without ﬂne reductions when
the former passes through the D{C{B region. In this case, in fact, the iso{welfare curve with ﬂne
reductions jumps to the right entering the C region, while with no Leniency Program the indiﬁerence
curve, which is the same as before in the D area, goes on smoothly in the C region31. Hence, entering
the C region from the top, the lower indiﬁerence curve is initially the one associated with no ﬂne
reduction. It may happen, as shown in ﬂgure 6.a, that continuing along it, the indiﬁerence curve
with ﬂne reductions becomes the lower one for a while. Finally, moving further to the right, the
indiﬁerence curve with full ﬂnes lies again below that with ﬂne reductions. For higher levels of the
expected welfare, the indiﬁerence curve with full ﬂnes always dominates that with reduced ﬂnes.
Hence, when we consider the indiﬁerence curves for increasing value of the expected welfare, as long
as we are in the A{C{B region we use Leniency Programs, while entering the D{C{B region we adopt
reduced ﬂnes only with a subset of policy parameters (ﬁ;p), as shown in ﬂgure 6.a. 2
31Strictly speaking, with no Leniency Program no C region exists; hence we refer to the C region as those policy
combinations deﬂned in case of ﬂne reductions.
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Figure 1: The game tree (D: deviation; C: collusion; I: investigation; NI: no investigation; R: reveal;
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